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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.-: 1AH: UF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 19053

ROBERT STEVEN SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Robert Steven Smith, was charged by
information with Attempted Robbery,

a third degree felony,

Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony,

and

in violation of

Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-4-101, 76-6-301, and 76-6-202 (1953 as
amended).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was
third degree
felony,

felony,

found guilty of Attempted Robbery, a

and Attempted Burglary, a third degree

in a jury trial held January 13, 17, and 19, 1983, in

the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake county,
State of Utah,

the Honorable David B. Dee presiding.

te>l,ruary 1, 1983,

On

appellant was sentenced to not more than

y<0ctrs at the Utah State Prison to be served concurrently
»'!; 1

1

t,e

terms he was already serving.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent
lhe

seeks an order of this Court affirming

Jurlq,'mPnt and sentence of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Robert Steven Smith, wns
the Utah State Prison and was
work release status (R.
was arrested

142).

incarcerate<1 ,11

residing in a half-way hous,, ""
On October 15, 1981 appellant

by South Salt Lake City police officers for

violation of his parole and suspicion of
criminal activity

(R.

142, 1173-1174).

being involved in a
Co-defendant Wayne

Sterling Pearson and two juveniles, Brian Scott Moss and
Gilbert Anthony Sisneros, were also taken into custody on that
date.

Following their arrest Mr. Moss and Mr.

Sisneros gave

police statements which, along with evidence produced from an
investigatory search of appellant's automobile (R. 1176-1181),
were sufficient to establish appellant's involvement

in a

scheme to burglarize and rob the home of Myra E. Kuhre (R.
140, 598-607, 984, 9%-998).
On October 15, 1981, as a result of appellant's
association with fellow half-way house resident Pearson in an
area not related to appellant's work release,

as well as his

suspected criminal activity, appellant was returned to the
Utah State Prison.

Appellant's work release status was

revoked and his January 1982 parole release date was rescinded
by the Utah Board of Pardons on the
violations

(R.

basis of the above parole

142-143).

From the October JS, 1981 arrest for parole
violation until March or April
follow-up

l9R2,

police conducted a

investigation to obtain evidence to corroborate

- 2-

trw

witnesses'

statements concerning the robbery scheme (R.

f',il ice officers

140).

investigating the case considered this case

to other criminal activity in the area and realized

,,,J,1tPrl

a discrete investigation was essential to avoid

t 11at

erKlan<Jering successful prosecution of other potential
defendants (R.
crJnt

141).

For this reason the investigation

inued beyond April 1982 and charges for attempted robbery

and burglary were not filed against appellant until September
7, 1982.
At trial,
delay in filing

appellant produced no evidence that the

the information for attempted robbery and

burglary resulted in any prejudice to his defense, nor did he
make any showing that the de lay was intentionally ca used by
the prosecutor to gain a tactical advantage over appellant (R.
14 3) •

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE ELEVEN MONTH DELAY
BETWEEN APPELLANT'S ARREST FOR PAROLE
VIOLATION AND THE DATE FORMAL CHARGES FOR
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AND ATTEMPTED BURGLARY
WERE MADE AGAINST HIM.
A.

THE SIXTH
TRIAL MAY
PERSON IS
COURSE OF

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY
NOT BE INVOKED UNTIL A
FORMALLY "ACCUSED" IN THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

Appellant claims that the delay of approximately
munths

between appellant's arrest for parole violation

-3-

and the date formal

charges for attempted robhery and burglar',

were filed against him violated his sixth Amendment right tr,,
speedy trial.

This contention is without merit.

a speedy trial

is guaranteed by the sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and
Utah Constitution.

The right

l,

by Article I, Section 12 of the

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial.

Article I,

Sect ion 12

provides that "[i]n criminal prosecution, the accused shall
have the right to •

• a speedy trial by an impartial jury of

the County or District in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed • •

The Sixth Amendment and Article I,

Section 12 guarantees of a speedy trial afford important
protections against undue and oppressive incarceration prior
to trial, minimize anxiety and concern which accompany public
accusation, and limit the possibility of impaired defense due
to long delay between accusation and trial.
States v.

Ewell,

See United

383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).

The right to a speedy trial, however, may not
invoked against every delay between accusation and trial.

The

Ewell court, after enumerating the reasons for speedy trial,
continued by qualifying the right as one relative to the
circumstances of each particular case.

The court stated that

some delays are necessary to ensure adequate prosecution, and
a defendant's right to a speedy trial "does not preclude the
right of public justice."

United States v.

-4-

Ewell,

383 u .s.

The constitutional right to speedy trial does not
"tt"' h

u11til a person has been "accused" of criminal activity.

Wt'J ·1e ;ippel lant

in the case at bar was arrested on October 15,

lQHl fnr parole violation, he was not formally "accused" of
attempted robbery and burglary until September 7, 1982.

Both

tne constitutional language as well as the language in the
Ewell opinion refer to the speedy trial right of the
In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.

t•accused."

307

(1971)

the Supreme Court expressly adopted this limitation, stating
that "the Six th Amendment speedy trial provision has no
application until the putative defendant in some way becomes
an 'accused

1

•

• On its face, the protection of the

Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has
hegun anci extends only to those persons who have been
'accused'

in the course of that prosecution."

v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
on the meaning of "accused."

united States

The Marion court also expounded
The court stated that the speedy

trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment are engaged upon:
either a formal indictment or information
nr else the actual restraints imposed by
arrest and holding to answer a criminal
charge . . . .
Invocation of the speedy trial provision
thus need not await indictment,
information, or other formal charge.
But
we decline to extend the reach of the
amendment to the period prior to arrest.
lint i l this event occurs, a citizen suffers
n'' restraints on his liberty and is not
Lhe subject of public accusation.

404 U.S. at 320-321.
-5-

Utah cases have also consistently held that no
speedy trial right exists until a prosecution has

teen

initiated by a formal

See

indictment or information.

generally State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968);
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 (1970).

In other

words, until a defendant is formally accused by indictment,
information, or arrest in the course of criminal prosecution,
the Speedy Trial Clause is irrelevant as to that crime.
Appellant's octoter 15, 1982 arrest was related to his parole
violation, and was not in the course of criminal prosecution
for attempted robbery and

burglary.

Many of the cases cited in appellant's brief are
distinguishable on this point.
Carolina,

386

u.s.

In both Klopfer v. North

213 (1967) and People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.

353, 130 N.E.2d 891

(1955), the delay complained of occurred

between the indictment and trial.

Thus, the defendant in each

case stood accused of the crime and was entitled to the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right.

In State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 2d

312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969), Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
and Dillingham v.

514 (19721

United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975), also

relied upon by appellant, the defendants had been arrested
pursuant to criminal prosecution, and thus stood accused of
criminal conduct.
B.
APPELLANT WAS NOT "ACCUSED" OF THE
PRESENT CHARGES UNTIL SEPTEMRER 7, 1982;
THUS, THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL DID NOT
ATTACH UNTIL THAT DATE.

In the present case, the Speedy Trial Clause is
as to appellant's confinement for parole violation

"'nor to the information which was filed September 7, 1982 for
attempted robtery and burglary (R. 143).

Appellant was not

formally "accused" of the present charges (attempted robbery
and attempted burglary) neither by indictment, nor
information, nor arrest, nor even by confinement until
Septemter 7, 1982.

Rather, appellant's arrest on Octoter 15,

1981 and subsequent return to the Utah State Prison was a
result of appellant's violation of his parole status and not
related to the September 7, 1982 charges of attempted robbery
and burglary.

Prior to his arrest, appellant was incarcerated

at the Utah State Prison pursuant to an unrelated conviction
and was living at a half-way house on work release status (R.
142).

on October 15, 1981, South Salt Lake City police

officers arrested appellant based on his being at a place not
related to his work release, his unauthorized association with
another half-way house resident, and his being suspected of
criminal activity -- all violations of appellant's conditions
of parole (R. 142-143).
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the Utah Board of
Pardons'

authority to assign conditions of parole to parolees
has allowed police officers to arrest and reimprison

"l•ec<' 0 ·rn

hased on violation of his conditions of parole.
5tate v.

J,,L,,ur

ized arrest

Kent, Utah, 665 P.2d 1317 (1983)

See

(The Court

based on defendant's violation of his parole

-7-

by association with known felons);
P.2d 777 (1979)

State v. Bullock, tltah, ',»,

(Parolee has limiterl liberty which may be

cancelled); Vriege v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 213,
(1966)

(Upheld the Board of Pardons'

conditions of parole and authorities'

419 P.2rl 769

right to attach
right to arrest and

reimprison a person for violating such conditions).
This Court,

in ward v. Smith, Utah, 573 P.2d 781

(1978), discussed in detail the role of the Board of Pardons
with respect to granting parole:
The Board of Pardons is created by the
constitution and its exclusive powers are
implemented by statute.
It has plenary
authority to conditionally release
prisoners on parole.
Parole is a
conditional release, the condition t:eing
that the prisoner make good or be returned
to serve his unexpired time (U.C.A.
77-62-l(b)(l953)).
I t is a privilege, an
act of grace as distinguished from a
right. Parole is not absolute liberty as
all law-abiding citizens enjoy, but only
conrlitional lit:erty dependant upon
compliance with parole restrictions.
The
parolee remains in legal custody until
such time as his sentence is terminated.
Parole revocation is an administrative
proceeding and not a criminal prosecuticn.
[see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471
(T972)].
I t stems from a clear violation
of the rules and regulations imposed as a
condition of parole,
ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann.

77-62-17

as amended), which provides

that parole revocation can occur without any violation of the
criminal law.

-8-

In the present case, during the entire period from
15, 1981 arrest for parole violation to the

1he- rict"rer

1982 charges for attempted robtery and

burglary,

';Pf•tPmhPr

"I,

0 pµellant

was incarcerated pursuant to a lawful commitment on

a previous charge.

This confinement did not commence criminal

prusecution and thereby activate the speedy trial guarantee,
but rather appellant's arrest was a result of his parole
revocation -- an administrative proceeding which would have
resulted regardless of appellant's explanation for teing in an
unauthorized area in the company of another half-way house
resident.

such an administrative proceeding is insufficient

to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
C.
THE PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY WAS FOR
INVESTIGATIVE REASONS AND DID NOT RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHT.
In determining whether an appellant's speedy trial
right has

been violated, the court will consider not only the

of time from arrest to indictment and indictment to
trial,

hut also any delay which occurs prior to the arrest.

Anrl while no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises
ur1t1l
tr

formal charges are pending, any unnecessary "delay prior

arr est or indictment may give rise to a due process claim
\,,,

tr1e Fifth Amendment."
1

(

1982)
411

'

'· .J'rc.;e,

United States v. MacDonald, 456

(citation omitted).

u.s.

See also united States

783, 788-789 (1977).

The Due Process

r1uwever, does not allow the courts complete discretion

-9-

to decide when an indictment should be sought or when an
arrest should be made.
should not

The court's judgment in this regard

be substituted for that of the attorney.

Accord 1 W'

to the United States Supreme court:
It requires no extended argument to
establish that prosecutors do not deviate
from "fundamental conceptions of justice"
when they defer seeking indictments until
they have prol:Bble cause to believe an
accused is guilty .
I t should be
equally o bJ ious that prosecutors are under
no duty to file charges as soon as
protable cause exists but before they are
satisfied they will be able to establish
the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
*
*
*
Penalizing prosecutors who defer actions
for [investigative delay] would
subordinate the goal of "orderly
expedition" to that of "mere speed,"
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10
(1959).
This the Due Process Clause does
not require.
we therefore hold that to
prosecute a defendant following
investigative delay does not deprive him
of due process, even if his defense might
have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse
of time.
United States v. Lovasco, 431

u.s.

at 790-791, 795-796.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has construed
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) as establishing a
two-pronged due process test against which to measure
pre-accusation delay.

In order for a defendant to

successfully maintain a due process claim he must show:

(1)

"actual prejudice resulting from the pre indictment delay,"
(2)

"that the delay was purposefully designed to gain

tactical advantage or to harass the defendants."

-10-

v.

Revada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1978) quoting

l'n1t0d States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir.

The United States Supreme Court in Lovasco confirmed
the

Tenth Circuit's interpretation by stating that "the due

process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as
wel 1 as the prejudice to the accused."
431 U.S. at 790.

United States v.

Likewise, this Court also

enunciated the same due process test in State v. Archuletta,
Utah, 577 P.2d 547 (1978).

In Archuletta this Court

rero]ni zed the accused's right to a prompt trial,

but also

stressed that "unless there is some intentional delay of an
oppressive character, which results in prejudice to the
defendant, the processes of justice should not
defeated

[by the delay]."

be wholly

State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d at

548-S49.
Thus in order to sustain a due process claim,
appPllant must show that preindictment delay caused
prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that
the delay was an intentional device by the prosecutor to gain
some tactical advantage over the accused.
cuiwlulie<i

The trial court

that appellant had met neither requirement (R. 143).
/\ppel lant argues that he was prejudiced due to his

,,-,_,ration.
"-''
t 1«
""

t,,

However, as already discussed, appellant's

prison was

based upon violations of the conditions

ri.,lf-way house status.
t11sL111u=,

Appellant has made no showing of

nor is there any,

where the delay prior to filing

-11-

charges caused harm to appellant or his case.
matter of right,
board.

Appellant

Parole is not

but is a discretionary function of the pa 1 ,
has made ahsolutely no showing that the

delay in filing charges caused the delay of the gratuitous
parole date.

Nor is a claim of prejudice

of time sufficient.

based upon passarJe

In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.

783, 796 ( 1977) the court held that investigative delay would
not give rise to a due process claim even if the defense
might have teen somewhat prejudiced.

The defendant

was prejudiced by the death of two witnesses, yet no due
process action would lie.

In the case at bar, appellant

claims that the State's witnesses were unable to consistently
remember the events of which they testified.
inconsistencies,

The

however, were not due to memory failure, but

rather to fabricated stories told by the two young men (R.
653-654, 664, 669-671, 1082-1085).

Nevertheless, even if the

inconsistencies were due to memory failure, the lapse of time
and its impact on memories will always be present in any
delay.
(1971).

See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.

307, 321-322

llhere there is no intention of delay for that

purpose, the mere passage of time is

insufficient to establish

substantial prejudice.
Appellant has also failed to show an intentional
delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage.

Appellant

implicitly makes a due process claim founded upon delay
tetween the octot:er 15, 1981 arrest for parole violation atr'1

-1 2-

c,q,temt>cr 7, 1982 filing of the information for attempted

tli•·

.1 '' l\' alld
I I 11 ..

lll•J

fact,

riurglary.

Appellant assumes that the information

ve °"en filed on the earlier date,

but has made no

to the effect but for his conjecture in hindsight.

In

the rlelay was necessary to allow police investigators

erlequate time to uncover evidence which would support the
'h0r,JeS of attempted robbery and attempted burglary.
trial court found that (1)

The

the investigation of this crime

was part of a larger investigation involving other potential
rlefenda nts;
hav"

( 2) early disclosure of the present charge might

Jeopanhzed the larger investigation; and

(3)

the crime

appellant was involved in was still under investigation (R.
140-141).

States v.

As previously discussed, and supported by United
Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790-791, 795-796,

investigative

rlelays alone are not violative of due process considerations,
a11d such delays are not to be regarded as an attempt to gain a
tart ical erlge over the accused.
D.
THE TIME PERIOD OF DELAY WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN WHAT IS PERMITTED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
This Court should also note that the period of delay
t,ef,,re commencing prosecution of the appellant was
1ally less than that permitted by the statute of
'"nlt"Jtlr•n°;,

which for Aggravated Robbery and Burglary is four

11t,,h Code Ann.<; 76-1-302 (1953 as amended).

-13-

CONCLUSION
Appellant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.
until a person has

This constitutional right does not attaci
teen "accused" of criminal activity.

A

person tecomes "accused" either by the filing of an
information or indictment or by arrest in connection with a
criminal prosecution.

Appellant,

however, was not "accused"

of the present charge until shortly before his trial.
Although appellant was arrested on October 15, 1981, eleven
months prior to his trial on charges of attempted robtery anrl
burglary,

that Octoter arrest was an administrative proceedin:

pursuant to appellant's violation of his parole conditions as
it related to a previous and unrelated conviction.
Appellant's pre-trial incarceration at the Utah State Prison
was not

in connect ion with the charges of the crimes which

pertain to this appeal.
Appellant had been convicted of previous charges and
was serving time at a half-way house on work release status
from the Utah State Prison.

On October 15, 1981 appellant

violated the conditions of his parole and was consequently
returned to the Prison.
sufficient

Violation of parole by appellant was

basis upon which to revoke his parole and return

him to the Utah state Prison to serve the remainder of his
previous sentence.
Moreover, appellant

is unable to show that the deJc,

in filing charges ayainst him deprived appellant of his ri9 1''

-14-

t"

due process of law.

;'i•['Pl
lnU

lant 's defense nor was it an intentional delay by the
U>

essential
as

The delay was neither prejudicial to

qain a tactical advantage.

Rather, the delay was

to allow adequate investigation of this case as well

inquiry into possible related criminal cases.

the

foregoing,

s ho u 1 d l::e

Based upon

the judgment and sentence of the trial court

af firmed .
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this

day of August,

1984,

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

-
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•J/

"7[: "z. (./-<... v_> \:::::::z &rvi.-::J '.""

J. STEPHEN MIKITA

/;
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy

of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Thomas J.
McCor·m ic k, attorney for appellant, 333 South Second East, Salt
tare

City, Utah R4111, this
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day of August, 1984.
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